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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 318 
Accident time: 06:55 Accident Date: 03/04/2000 
Where it occurred: Vila Franco do Save, 
Govuro District, 
Inhambane Province 
Country: Mozambique 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Excavation accident 
(Survey) 
Date of main report: 05/04/2000 
ID original source: IND 2143/ADP-13/DG Name of source: ADP/IND 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 20/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 34° 34' 09" E Latitude: 21° 08' 52" S 
Alt. coord. system: Lat: 21.08 52.38"S. Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Long: 034 34 09.18"E Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
 
Accident report 
A report was prepared for the National Mine Action Authority and made available in 
November 2000. Completed in English, the following summarises its content. 
The accident occurred while carrying out a Survey Level 2 at Save minefield and the first 
deminer was tasked to make a cut into the minefield to a visible anti-group mine.  The survey 
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section continued the work of the previous week, preparing a safe base-lane for the deminer 
section. The ground at the site was hard and “mixed with stones”, making it difficult to “prod 
and to use the shovel [trowel]”. 
The length of the lane was about 70 metres when the first deminer went in to start the cut at 
06:30. At the place where he was working (15 metres from the beginning of the safe lane) the 
survey section had destroyed a PMN four days before. The mine had been visible and 60cm 
outside the minefield fence. 
The victim worked for about 25 minutes. He removed a piece of metal, then checked again 
with his detector. Having got another reading, (heard by his Section Commander who was 
10m away) he started to excavate with his “shovel”. He hit another PMN which detonated. At 
the time he was kneeling on his right knee and was slightly sideways on to the detonation. 
[The use of the word “shovel” is misleading: the victim was using a gardening “trowel”.] 
The victim received first aid within three minutes and was in hospital being treated by an ex-
pat doctor in Save after 30 minutes. 50 minutes later he had been air evacuated to 
Inhambane Provincial Hospital. His injuries were “mostly” on the right side of the right knee, 
hand, body and face. “Dust stones and mine fragments had to be removed from the wounds. 
No amputation was necessary.” 
It was later discovered that the entire metal head of the victim’s trowel was inside his thigh. 
This was not discovered until he was in hospital. The distorted trowel head and separated 
handle is shown below. 
 
 
Other information 
The mine in this accident (also the one found four days before) was outside the fence on the 
“friendly” side of the minefield. The mine in the accident was 30cm outside the fence, the 
earlier one 60cm.  
The local guide assisting the survey mentioned five mines laid outside this side of the fence 
and an unknown number on the other. 
The demining Section had been working for a long time in other soil conditions and were not 
used to the hard stony ground at the site. 
From the position of the shovel and the handle of the shovel [trowel] the investigators 
concluded that he had struck the mine on the left side.  
The time between hearing the detector signal and the detonation was very short, meaning 
that the victim failed to use his prodder to “soften” the ground before using the trowel. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no guarantee that there are not mines on the friendly side of the minefield. 
The action taken after getting a detector reading was not correct. 
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Recommendations 
The use of handtools must be better “supervised and carried through by Section 
Commanders”. 
The Field Commanders’ guide should be updated to avoid further accidents arising through 
the misuse of demining tools. Pinpointing detector readings and marking the centre clearly will 
support these efforts. 
 
[The researcher photographed the trowel during a field visit when the Accident Investigators 
explained what had occurred.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 400 Name: Name removed 
Age: 29 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 50 minutes (at least) 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hearing 
severe Body 
severe Face 
severe Hand 
severe Leg 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief field medical report recorded the victim’s date of birth and the following: 
Temperature: 36.8 
Blood pressure: 130/90 
Pulse: 60/75 pm 
Respiration: 18/20 pm 
The victim was evacuated by air which took “about” 50 minutes. He was taken from the Save 
River to Inhambane Provincial hospital. 
A hearing problem was recorded on the demining group’s injury spreadsheet. 
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Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victim 
was working incorrectly and his error was not corrected – despite the close proximity of a 
supervisor.  
The Secondary cause” is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems that the victim was 
accustomed to working in areas where the use of a prod was not essential to loosen ground 
prior to using a trowel, but did not think about the excessive force he was having to use. 
Partly as a result of this accident, the demining group decided to use purpose designed, blast-
resistant handtools in future. 
The accident report was inadequate because no record was made of the protective 
equipment in use at the time. 
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